Court of Justice in NEO Group: tax abuse in dividend distributions – relevance for dividend planning
In brief
On 15 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union again ruled on tax abuse in cross-border dividend distributions, in NEO Group (C-203/25).
The Court confirms that an EU parent company that carries on a genuine economic activity, and can be regarded as the beneficial owner of the dividends it receives, is still not necessarily a tax ‘safe harbour’. The tax authorities may examine the entire chain of transactions to determine whether that chain, or certain parts of it, must be regarded as artificial. If, in addition, one of the main purposes of the arrangement is to obtain a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the withholding tax exemption may be denied.
The judgment builds on the Court’s earlier case law on tax abuse in dividend distributions, including the recent Nordcurrent judgment (C-228/24). It clarifies that the anti-abuse test is not limited to the direct relationship between the distributing company and the recipient company. It may extend to the entire chain of transactions of which the dividend distribution forms part.
The judgment is also of particular significance for Belgian dividend planning and tax practice.
The judgment: facts and ruling
The dispute concerns the Lithuanian company NEO Group UAB. In 2016 and 2017, it distributed dividends totalling EUR 15 million to its Cypriot parent company, Retal Industries Ltd. (‘Retal’). In the same period, Retal also received dividends of approximately EUR 13.5 million from another Lithuanian subsidiary.
The Lithuanian tax authorities did not dispute that Retal carried on a genuine economic activity. NEO further argued that Retal was the beneficial owner within the meaning of the double tax treaty between Lithuania and Cyprus. The Lithuanian tax authorities, however, took the view that the beneficial owner was the natural person who controlled the group.
The Lithuanian tax authorities also found that the dividend distributions formed part of a broader chain of transactions.
A Belize-based company, Clendon Holdings Inc., had sold its shares in Retal to PPH Polymer Products Holding Ltd., a Cypriot holding company incorporated less than three months earlier. The purchase price was EUR 310.4 million, and its payment was deferred. The resulting receivable was then assigned to a natural person who was the ultimate beneficial owner of both the selling and the acquiring company.
Through a series of dividend distributions, loans and assignments of receivables, funds from the Lithuanian companies were then channelled to this natural person, and the related debt positions were settled.
According to the Lithuanian tax authorities, these transactions were an artificial arrangement aimed at avoiding tax on the dividends distributed from Lithuania. On that basis, they denied the withholding tax exemption. NEO received an additional tax assessment of EUR 2.25 million, plus interest and a penalty.
The case was subsequently referred to the Court of Justice.
The Court holds that the anti-abuse provision of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not, in principle, preclude the exemption from being denied where the recipient parent company forms part of a chain of transactions that is artificial in whole or in part. This applies even if that parent company itself carries on a genuine economic activity.
The Court stresses that assessing tax abuse requires an examination of all relevant facts and circumstances. It is therefore not enough to examine only the economic activity or substance of the parent company that directly receives the dividends. Nor does beneficial ownership status within the meaning of a tax treaty provide adequate protection. Treaties between Member States, even those based on the OECD Model Tax Convention, cannot be relied upon to achieve a result contrary to EU law.
The Court then clarifies which circumstances may be relevant indications of an artificial arrangement.
For instance, account may be taken of whether the amounts of dividends received correspond to the amounts that ultimately reach the controlling shareholder through successive transactions. Such correspondence does not give rise to an automatic presumption of abuse, but it may be an indication of abuse.
The fact that the dividends are passed on within a short period of time is also a relevant indication, but it is not a requirement. An artificial arrangement is not ruled out where the financial flows concerned occur at regular intervals over a longer period.
The Court further confirms that it does not matter that the transactions regarded as artificial take place outside the source State of the dividends. The tax authorities of the source State may also take into account transactions carried out elsewhere in the group structure, both before and after the dividend distribution concerned. Moreover, the tax advantage need not be obtained by the distributing subsidiary. It may also be obtained by the natural person who controls the group and resides in another Member State. In addition, an arrangement that was initially put in place for valid commercial reasons may become artificial if it is maintained after those reasons have ceased to exist.
Nor is it required that the distributing company itself was, or could have been, aware of the artificial nature of the broader chain of transactions. For the anti-abuse provision to apply, it may be sufficient that the requisite subjective element is established in respect of another group company involved, or of the natural person who ultimately enjoys the tax advantage.
The Court nevertheless emphasises that finding an artificial arrangement is not, in itself, sufficient to deny the dividend exemption. It must also be demonstrated that one of the main purposes of the arrangement is to obtain a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The burden of proving the constituent elements of tax abuse lies with the tax authorities.
Whether tax abuse exists in a specific case is ultimately for the competent national authority to determine.
Implications for Belgian tax practice
Belgian tax legislation contains a general anti-abuse provision as well as specific anti-abuse rules. These specific rules apply to the exemption of dividends received through the dividends received deduction (DRD) and to the exemption from Belgian withholding tax on distributed dividends.
The NEO Group case concerns the withholding tax exemption directly. The approach the Court develops is, however, equally relevant to the application of the Belgian anti-abuse rules in the context of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
The judgment may prompt the Belgian tax authorities to scrutinise the entire chain of transactions even more closely in cross-border dividend distributions, rather than looking only at the subsidiary and parent company directly involved. For the Belgian distributing company, this is by no means a theoretical risk. As the party liable for the withholding tax, it bears the withholding tax and late payment interest if the exemption is denied. This is the case even if it was itself unaware of the transactions further up the group.
The judgment in no way calls into question the existence of holding structures as such. It does confirm, however, that a holding company’s economic substance is not necessarily sufficient to exclude the application of the anti-abuse provision. This is the case where the dividend distribution forms part of a broader set of transactions, certain elements of which may be regarded as artificial.
The tax authorities naturally remain required to demonstrate the existence of tax abuse, taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances. Artificial elements in a chain of transactions therefore do not automatically lead to the tax exemption being denied.
The Court of Justice’s approach is also consistent with the case law of the Belgian Court of Cassation. In its judgment of 30 November 2023 on the EU-law principle prohibiting abuse, the Court of Cassation accepted that an assessment of tax abuse may take into account all of the transactions carried out within a group of companies. Business reasons for an individual transaction do not necessarily rule out that the transactions taken together constitute tax abuse.
The NEO Group judgment therefore confirms that the economic and tax motives behind a group structure, and behind the transactions connected with it, must be assessed as a whole.
For Belgian tax practice, this means that tax due diligence for a dividend exemption begins with the direct relationship between the distributing subsidiary and the recipient parent company, but certainly does not end there.
Transactions further up or elsewhere in the group structure may also be relevant. This is especially so where dividend flows are used to finance share transactions, to settle debt positions or to distribute funds to the ultimate shareholders.
It is therefore essential to be able to substantiate both the economic reality of the individual companies and the business rationale for each step in the chain of transactions. The central message of the judgment is clear: economic substance at the level of the parent company directly receiving the dividends does not, in itself, provide adequate protection against a broader anti-abuse test applied to the entire chain of transactions.