1. New definition of “product”
The bill broadens the definition of “product” to cover tangible items even when integrated into another product. It also expressly includes digital manufacturing files, raw materials and software, while excluding free and open-source software developed or supplied outside an economic activity.
2. New mechanism for the disclosure of evidence before the courts
The bill inserts a new Article 877/1 into the Judicial Code, introducing a specific mechanism for the disclosure of evidence. Where a claimant has presented sufficient evidence to support the plausibility of a product liability claim, the court may order the defendant to produce relevant evidence in its possession. The mechanism also works in reverse: a defendant who has demonstrated a need for evidence to contest the claim may obtain disclosure from the claimant. Disclosure must be necessary and proportionate, with safeguards for confidential information and trade secrets.
3. New presumptions affecting the burden of proof
An important change is the introduction of rebuttable presumptions concerning both defectiveness and causation. Defectiveness would be presumed in specified circumstances, including where relevant evidence has not been disclosed, where a product fails to comply with mandatory safety requirements, or where damage is caused by a manifest malfunction during reasonably foreseeable use or under ordinary circumstances.
Causation is presumed where a defect has been established and the damage is of a kind typically consistent with that defect. In addition, where claimants face excessive difficulties in proving defectiveness and/or causation, particularly because of technical or scientific complexity, those elements would also be presumed if the requisite likelihood is demonstrated. Defendants would retain the right to rebut these presumptions.
4. Extended long-stop period for latent personal injury
The bill maintains the general ten-year long-stop period but introduces an exception for certain personal injuries. Where an injured person has been unable to bring proceedings within that period because of the slow-developing nature of a personal injury, the long-stop period is extended to up to twenty-five years.